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procedural international state system—
would have to provide for the dispersal
of power and the circulation of powerholders and thus be not only compatible
with but indispensable to ‘true’ belief.”
Gerecht’s equally brief essay adopts a
similar remedy, albeit one less philosophical and historical, and more focused on
the nature of contemporary islam, especially its more radical expressions since
9/11. he wastes no time in confronting
our dilemma head-on: Westerners clearly
support democratic reform when it is a
question of ending the regimes of the
virulent iranian theocrats, the thuggish
bashar Assad, the nightmarish, genocidal
Saddam hussein, or the mad Colonel
Qaddafi—although less so after the iraqi
violence, during which Americans soured
on the expense of blood and treasure on
behalf of what seemed sullen and ungracious allies. but the real rub comes with
pro-Western dictatorships that claim they
have put a lid on islamic extremism in
return for American money, alliance, or
exemption from human-rights criticism:
Why should we help topple our “friends,”
only to see our enemies win ensuing plebiscites, especially given the troubling
paradox that illiberal autocrats often seem
more liberal than their illiberal grassroots
publics?
As he has argued in the decade since
9/11, Gerecht says that Arab strongmen
only feign support for the u.S. while privately encouraging home-grown dissidents to turn on us, on the pretext that
Washington, not Cairo, Tunis, or Amman,
made the Arab Street poor and unfree. The
Middle east public, Gerecht believes, is
anti-American and seemingly illiberal not
necessarily because of radical islam or
intrinsic hatred of the West, but because it
has been so abused and manipulated by its
own governments, often with a Western
wink and nod.
Thus the only way to end these sick
relationships is through the messy
catharses of democratic change, for clearly there is popular discontent with both
iranian-style theocracy and egyptianstyle autocracy, the common theme being
an oppressive police state that ruins the
economy. The trick for the West, Gerecht
further thinks, is to promote democratic
reformers, concede that under intermediate referenda angry anti-Westerners might
come to the fore, but ultimately trust that
democracy within an Arab islamic context will, for all its unpleasant rhetoric and

distance from the American town hall,
prove far better for the masses, and hence
far better for America as well.
Gerecht has offered a hastily written
afterword to take into account the 2011
uprisings, in which he suggests that the
present unrest is day by day proving the
validity of his theses. Yet as the news
changes hourly, and events in egypt seem
to offer more pessimism than hope, readers might challenge Gerecht’s upbeat
appraisal of the Muslim brotherhood:
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The egyptian Muslim brotherhood, an
organization born and raised in clandestine opposition to foreign occupation and
domestic dictatorship, has many profound misgivings about democracy.
There’s not a fundamentalist alive who
doesn’t have misgivings. but what is extraordinary to note about the brotherhood, since the rebellion in Tunisia
began, is the extent to which it has publicly and passionately embraced the idea
that democracy is the only legitimate
political system for egypt and the rest of
the Muslim World.

As for the islamist and often illiberal
direction of Turkish prime minister Recep
erdogan, who rose to power democratically, Gerecht acknowledges the dangers,
and the shrill rhetoric, but is confident
nonetheless that the Ataturk legacy, the
affinity for and influence from european
culture, and the intrinsic liberalizing
mechanism of constitutional government
will all constrain erdogan’s islamist
ambitions. in other words, we may not
like his anti-Western slurs and obnoxious
gestures, but erdogan’s presence has had
the ironic effect of quieting extremism
and channeling it within the political
realm—just as democracies are wont to
do.
let us hope that Gerecht is correct, and
that we can put to rest the warning that
islamists, as in the cases of iran and
hamas, do indeed favor truly free and
open democratic elections—but only one
time; or rather, let us concede that even
such elected thugocracies are not quite the
end of the story, as we see from current
popular iranian and Palestinian unhappiness with both illiberal regimes. hill and
Gerecht are neither messianic neocons
nor naïve idealists, but experienced skeptics who came to their advocacy of American support for sweeping constitutional
change in the Middle east not as a first
option, but as a last resort after a half century of assorted failures.

Why Niebuhr Now?,
by John Patrick Diggins
(Chicago, 152 pp., $22)

R

niebuhR, the distinguished theologian and theorist of “Christian realism,”
used to be a major intellectual presence in the united States. he was
that rarity, a theologian and public intellectual who wrote with intelligence,
competence, and sobriety about world
affairs. From the late 1930s through the
1960s, niebuhr helped shape the judgment of those who were responsible for
leading the u.S. during the “American
century.” his Christian realism had next
to nothing in common with amoral Realpolitik or with the fashionable denial
that ideology played a decisive role in
shaping the foreign policy of the Soviet
union. it was indebted to St. Augustine
and freely emphasized theological and
moral categories.
A self-described “dialectical” thinker,
niebuhr was and remains difficult
to pigeonhole ideologically. he was
respected by thoughtful men of the left
and the Right. The pre-Camelot Arthur
einhold
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Schlesinger Jr. was a particularly en thusiastic admirer, and Whittaker Chambers wrote a memorable piece on Niebuhr
for Time magazine in 1948. A democratic socialist through the 1930s, Niebuhr
in the late 1940s and 1950s increasingly
leaned toward Burkean conservatism.
At the end of his life, disillusioned by
the Vietnam War and perhaps concerned
to demonstrate the ongoing relevance of
Christian realism to a new generation of
social activists, Niebuhr insisted that his
anti-utopian view of human nature was
always intended to be at the service of
an “ethic of progressive justice.” Like
Orwell, Niebuhr was destined to be
claimed by all the parties while belonging to none.
Niebuhr came from the left (he helped
found Americans for Democratic Action) but directed much of his ire at the
“stupidity” of the “children of light.”
These were democratic humanitarians
and sentimentalists who underestimated
the power of evil in human affairs and
who had unreasonable faith in the
inevitable forward march of History. In
classic works like his 1939 Gifford
Lectures, The Nature and Destiny of
Man, and 1944’s The Children of Light
and the Children of Darkness, Niebuhr
forcefully rejected the utopian delusions
of modern thought, as well as the adequacy of a pacifist response to the totalitarian enemies of civilization. There is
an unmistakable pathos that informs his
reflections on the self-deceptions of the
“children of light,” who are all too vulnerable to manipulation at the hands of
the cynical and nihilistic enemies of
modern democracy.
These fundamental insights are highlighted with precision and elegance in
John Patrick Diggins’s posthumously
published meditation on the thought and
legacy of the Lutheran theologian and
social ethicist. Diggins, a distinguished
intellectual historian whose work displayed an admirable sensitivity to the
religious undercurrents of American
history, impressively demonstrates the
depth of Niebuhr’s opposition to the
“sociological turn” in modern thought.
It was the height of folly to blame the
persistence of evil on external social
forces. In general, Niebuhr rejected the
facile optimism of the Enlightenment—
what he called the “traditional defense
of democracy”—and made “original
sin” the basis of a new understanding of
44
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democracy that was at once realistic and
humane. This ability to make the seemingly outdated seem relevant, even compelling, was the source of Niebuhr’s
attraction for secular elites who otherwise evinced no interest in religious or
theological accounts of political life.
Niebuhr argued with great conviction,
and no little eloquence, that Christianity
offered a more truthful or “empirical”
account of the nature of man than the
secular alternatives, ancient, modern,
and contemporary. His apologia for
Christianity had the added attraction of
being rooted in reflection on human
nature and thus not depending on revelation per se.
In Niebuhr’s view, Christianity put
forward a compellingly paradoxical
view of humankind as existing at the
“juncture” of nature and spirit, “perilously caught,” in Diggins’s paraphrase, “between its freedom and its
finitude.” The Christian account of man
did not reduce human beings to either
pole and thus avoided the extremes of
utopian optimism and debilitating pessimism. Diggins pungently summarizes
Niebuhr’s position: “The law of love is
normative, but the fact of sin is universal.” While respecting the “prophetic”
critique of existing society, Niebuhr did
not hesitate to criticize social reformers and revolutionaries who exempted

THE MAN ROBBED
AND BEATEN AND
LEFT FOR DEAD
Across the level road I see
Somebody. He looks back at me.
(And help will come, or help will pass
By these outdated wisps of grass.)
No height or depth can intervene.
Only the smooth stones lie between.
How was my agony outrun?
I have poured out the wind and sun
(Crickets and flies and passersby)
And only watch from where I lie.
—SARAH RUDEN

themselves from the self-regard they
thought they could expunge from the
world.
Diggins is a non-believer (a lapsed
Catholic) who nonetheless is attracted
to the human wisdom inherent in Niebuhr’s Christian realism. Diggins has no
time for clever postmodern nihilism
where everything is said to be “contingent” or “constructed” and thus capable
of being “deconstructed” out of existence. He finds an exciting and salutary
alternative in Niebuhr’s “profoundly
new interpretation of Christianity,” one
that continues to speak to an “age of
anxiety” in which thinking men have
lost confidence in the resources provided by either reason or revelation. But
Diggins overstates just how new Niebuhr’s “neo-orthodox” approach to
political theology really was. He goes
too far when he says that Niebuhr “corrects” Jesus’s “impossible ‘love ethic.’”
Diggins seems to presuppose that Jesus
himself was a political romantic—
admirable, pure, quasi-utopian—who
shared the naïveté of the “children of
light.” What he fails to recognize is the
transpolitical character of the New
Testament (“my kingdom is not of this
world”), even if its understanding of
human destiny has profoundly important political implications. The political
theorist Jean Bethke Elshtain has rightly
warned against detaching Niebuhr’s
anthropological wisdom from its larger
Christian framework. In Diggins’s case,
we see how that detachment, however
benignly motivated, leads to a distortion
of the theological character of Niebuhr’s
enterprise and even of Christian wisdom
itself. Nor is this the only significant
defect in Why Niebuhr Now?
The book is also marred by a political
idée fixe about the threat of an illdefined neoconservatism. This tends to
distort its overall analysis. Diggins is
convinced that overbearing national
pride, a one-sided identification of
America with unalloyed goodness, is the
dominant contemporary threat to the
integrity of the American experiment in
democratic self-government. He sees
national self-righteousness everywhere
and has very little to say about the full
range of foreign-policy challenges confronting America today. He knew the
Cold War had to be fought (Diggins was
in many respects an old-fashioned Cold
War liberal) and even acknowledged
AUGUST 1, 2011
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that Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, an older and
more sober neoconservative, was right
when she attacked the radical Left for
always “blaming America first.” But
Diggins says little about what is at stake
in our ongoing conflict with militant
Islam and global terrorism. His focus is
nearly exclusively on American “arrogance,” the blind confidence Americans
are said to have in our national “innocence.” In a kind of reverse Manicheanism, America becomes for Diggins
the principal troublemaker in the contemporary world precisely because of its
exaggerated sense of the good it can
achieve for itself and others.
There are no doubt powerful strands
of national self-righteousness in the
American tradition, and no small dose of
secular messianism in the Wilsonian
imperative to “make the world safe for
democracy.” Reinhold Niebuhr was
right to warn against such messianism in
both its religious and its secular forms.
But as we have already suggested,
Niebuhr was a supremely “dialectical”
thinker. His powerful, and still relevant,
warnings against national hubris were
not his final word on the subject.
In an otherwise thoughtful discussion
of The Irony of American History
(1952), Niebuhr’s most comprehensive
account of the American political tradition, Diggins fails to adequately come to
terms with the wonderfully suggestive
concluding pages of that work. This can
also be said of more strident LeftNiebuhrians such as the foreign-policy
scholar Andrew Bacevich. Niebuhr
turned to Lincoln’s Second Inaugural to
show how it was possible to combine an
uncompromising defense of the “moral
treasures” of a free civilization with a
religious or philosophical vantage point
that recognized that the ways of God are
not the ways of men (“The Almighty has
His own purposes,” as Lincoln so memorably put it). “Lincoln’s model,” as
Niebuhr called it, “would rule out the
cheap efforts which are frequently made
to find some simple moral resolution of
our conflict with communism. Modern
communist tyranny is certainly as wrong
as the slavery which Lincoln opposed.”
At the same time, Lincoln invites us
to combine “moral resoluteness about
the immediate issues with a religious
awareness of another dimension of
meaning and judgment.” To be aware
of a “contradiction between divine and

human purposes, even on the highest
level of human aspirations,” is in no way
to relativize the human stakes of politics.
But Niebuhr’s delicate mean would
not hold. Today, the author of the seminal 1940 essay “Why the Christian
Church Is Not Pacifist” is generally
claimed by those who oppose the use of
military force, even when dealing with
implacable enemies of civilization.
Contemporary Left-Niebuhrians do not
read Niebuhr “dialectically” enough.
But part of the problem may lie with
Niebuhr’s theoretical framework itself.
Is human nature as radically corrupted
by original sin as Niebuhr suggests? Is
virtue always and everywhere deformed
by pride? Ideological Manicheanism,
the temptation to locate goodness entirely on one side of a political divide and
evil entirely on the other, was the monstrous hallmark of ideological totalitarianism in the 20th century. It is also a
temptation, although of a different scope
and scale, for democratic peoples when
the promotion of democracy is taken up
with evangelical fervor. But relativism,
an exaggerated sense of our own faults,
and an accompanying masochistic selfcriticism can also distort our appreciation of the moral stakes of politics. It
takes rare courage and insight, indeed,
to combine a spirited defense of human
freedom with a sense of modesty and
limits, with what Solzhenitsyn calls
“self-limitation.” The judicious blending of magnanimity and humility might
even be said to be the defining characteristic of true political greatness. Yet,
for all Niebuhr’s wisdom, his writings
do not provide us with an adequate
framework for articulating and appreciating such greatness.
Despite its limitations, this eminently
readable volume has the merit of re minding us of Reinhold Niebuhr’s greatness. In a time when theology and
philosophy had lost the ability to speak
to the common concerns of citizens,
when they had too often succumbed to
abstruse language and assorted ideological temptations, Niebuhr thought and
wrote about things that mattered. And he
did so with clarity, intelligence, and
good sense. He remains our “contem porary” even if we are not obliged to
slavishly follow his path, let alone the
one-sided counsel that is sometimes put
forward in his name.

China’s
Big Lie
JOHN DERBYSHIRE

Such Is This World@sars.come,
by Hu Fayun, translated by A. E. Clark
(Ragged Banner Press, 536 pp., $38; also
available as an e-book from Ragged
Banner’s website, $14)

T

HeRe has never been a good
time to be an honest writer in
Communist China, but the present is an exceptionally bad
time. Spooked by the “Arab Spring” and
jostling for position in next year’s scheduled leadership changes, the party bosses
have been coming down hard on every
kind of independent thinking. The cases
of Nobel peace prize winner Liu Xiaobo
and artist Ai Weiwei have been well publicized, but there are many others.
essayist Liu Xianbin, released in 2008
after nine years’ imprisonment for “inciting subversion of state power,” was rearrested last summer. In March of this year,
he was given a new ten-year sentence on
that same charge. Along with this lawless
brutality towards their own citizens,
China’s rulers do all they can to intimidate
foreigners who seek to help dissident
writers. A Chinese writer needs a translator, and those best equipped to translate
are Western scholars making a career in
China studies. Such a career will be handicapped, though, if the scholar is denied
visas to enter China. The Communists
make sure Western Sinologists know this.
Chinese-literature specialist Perry Link,
blacklisted since 1996, has written a fine
essay about the problem: “The Anaconda
in the Chandelier.”
The misfortunes that have afflicted Hu
Fayun’s 2004 dissident novel Such Is This
World@sars.come have therefore been
nothing out of the ordinary. The manuscript was posted on a website in 2004;
the website was quickly shut down. A
Beijing publisher brought out a bowdlerized version in 2006, but the book was
proscribed the following year as the Communists tightened controls prior to the
2008 Beijing Olympics. A Princeton
Sinology graduate considered making a
translation, but backed off on learning
that the book was banned in China.
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